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This paper explores the impact of the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in the context of Union citizenship and internal market free 
movement law. The starting point is the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on 
the right to use minority languages in court proceedings. According to the Court’s 
reasoning, this right should be extended to all mobile Union citizens on equal 
footing with nationals of the particular Member State granting that right to 
persons residing in a specific territorial entity of that State. The authors critically 
evaluate the legal basis of the Court’s approach, focusing on the interaction and 
mutual impact of internal market and citizenship case law. The paper further 
explores the national regulation of the right to use minority language in court 
proceedings, as well as the right to interpretation in criminal proceedings, and 
reveals possible inconsistencies with EU law. In addition, it investigates whether 
legislative interventions are needed and analyses theoretical and practical aspects 
of various potential de lege ferenda solutions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The prohibition of discrimination based on nationality is a fundamental 
principle and a corner stone of the freedom of movement in the EU. The 
application of this principle in practice leads to far-reaching and sometimes 
(un)expected consequences as can be observed on the example of the use of 
a minority language in court proceedings. The latter merits special attention 
considering that, with the exception of Malta, all EU Member States have at 
least one minority.1 Needless to say, with the recent influx of migrants, refu-
gees and asylum-seekers to many Member States, the number of immigrant 
minority languages is increasing as well. Considering that languages spoken 
by immigrants are as a rule not protected by legal norms, we shall focus on 
regional minority languages. Albeit the status of and the right to use minor-
ity languages are regulated differently across EU Member States, minority 
languages are usually limited to certain regions or parts of a country where 
equal use of a minority and official language is guaranteed in administrative 
and/or court proceedings, work of representative and executive bodies of local 
government, education etc. The extent of this guarantee is entirely depend-
ent on national legislation and international obligations of a Member State. 
However, the right to use minority language is almost exclusively reserved for 
nationals of that particular Member State, who are members of a national 
minority and reside in a specific territory of that state. The effect of this rule 
in a multinational and multilingual setting such as the EU is problematic, es-
pecially when it collides with the principle of non-discrimination. The starting 
point of this paper is the analysis of a judgement of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter: CJEU) in the case Rüffer, C-322/132, where the 
Court interpreted the national rule granting the use of a minority language in 
civil court proceedings only to nationals of that Member State resident in a 
particular territorial unit as contrary to the principle of non-discrimination. 
1 As a matter of fact, in the EU-27 there were 191 minorities. Rumania for instance 
has 18, and Hungary and Poland each 13. See Pan, C., Die Minderheitenfrage in 
der Europäischen Union, Europäisches Journal für Minderheitenfragen vol. II, no. 1, 
2009, pp. 20 – 31.
2 Case C-322/13, Ulrike Elfriede Grauel Rüffer v Katerina Pokorná, EU:C:2014:189. 
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2. EU CITIZENSHIP AND FREE MOVEMENT IN THE INTERNAL 
MARKET: DISCRIMINATION, ANYONE?
The concept of EU citizenship was first introduced in EU law in 1992, 
by the Treaty on European Union.3 Its key features are today summarized in 
Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (herein-
after: TFEU).4 The Union citizenship differs from national citizenship: it is 
additional to it and does not replace it. Every person holding a nationality of 
a Member State is a Union citizen. As aptly put by Advocate General Jacobs, 
“the notion of citizenship of the Union implies a commonality of rights and 
obligations uniting Union citizens by a common bond transcending Mem-
ber State nationality”.5 In the rhetoric of the CJEU, “Union citizenship is 
destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, 
enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same 
treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as 
are expressly provided for”.6 The provisions on EU citizenship in the TFEU 
precede those on fundamental freedoms and other Union policies, emphasiz-
ing that they follow different objectives, unrelated to the economic nature of 
activities associated with the free movement in the internal market. Many 
doctrinal discussions revolve around the question whether Union citizenship 
is capable of assuming the primary role determining the legal status of Member 
States’ nationals and grant the Union citizens a wide spectrum of citizenship 
rights supplanting the fundamental freedoms, which are inextricably linked to 
economic activities.7 The current state of affairs, as evident from the jurispru-
3 Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992, Official Jour-
nal of the European Communities, C 191 of 29 July 1992.
4 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version 2016), 
Official Journal of the European Union, C 202 of 7 June 2016.
5 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 19 March 1998, Case C-274/96, 
Criminal proceedings against Horst Otto Bickel and Ulrich Franz, EU:C:1998:115, para. 
23.
6 Case 184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 
Judgement of the Court of 20 September 2001, EU:C:2001:458, para. 31.
7 For an overview of the current debates, see, for example, Tryfonidou, A., The impact 
of Union Citizenship on the EU’s Market Freedoms, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Port-
land, Oregon, 2016; Craig, P.; de Búrca, G., EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials, 
5th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; Shaw, J., Citizenship: Contrasting 
dynamics at the interface of integration and constitutionalism, in: Craig, P.; de Búrca, G. 
(eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 
575 – 610; Kosakopoulou, T., European Union Citizenship: The Journey Goes on, in: 
M. Bajčić, A. Martinović: EU Citizenship, Free movement and the Use of Minority...110
dence of the CJEU8 shows, however, that this potential effect of citizenship is 
still far from realisation.
Nevertheless, both citizenship and fundamental economic freedoms are 
built on the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality. Discrimi-
nation of nationals of other Member States may be either direct (based on 
nationality itself) or indirect (based on grounds other than nationality, usually 
residence, but having the same results9). Article 18(1) TFEU clearly prohib-
its any discrimination on grounds of nationality, within the scope of applica-
tion of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained 
therein. Any difference in treatment which is based on objective factors unre-
lated to nationality could potentially serve as justification, provided that the 
requirement of proportionality is satisfied.10 Therefore, Union citizenship and 
economic freedoms arise from identical premise of equal treatment based on 
nationality, and their mutual interaction brings about evolution in both fields.
Ott, A.; Vos, E. (eds.), Fifty Years of European Integration: Foundations and Perspectives, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2009, pp. 271 – 290; Lenaerts, K., ‘Civis europaeus 
sum’: from the cross-border link to the status of citizen of the Union, FMW – Online Journal 
on free movement of workers within the European Union, No 3, December 2011, 
Publications office of the European Union, pp. 6 – 18. 
8 Especially in relation to access of EU citizens to social benefits in another Member 
State. See for example, case C-140/12, Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey, 
EU:C:2013:565; case C-313/13, Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig 
EU:C:2014:2358; case C-67/14, Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Nazifa Alimanovic and Oth-
ers, EU:C:2015:597; case C-299/14, Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v Jo-
vanna García-Nieto and Others, EU:C:2016:114. See also a line of case law concerning 
the so-called ‘purely internal situations’, where the absence of any cross-border ele-
ment prevents the application of EU law, unless the national measure has the effect 
of depriving the Union citizen of genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
associated with that status, or of impeding the exercise of the right to move and re-
side freely within the territory of the Member States: Case C-434/09, Shirley McCa-
rthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department, EU:C:2011:277, paras. 49-50; Case 
C-256/11, Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, EU:C:2011:734, 
paras. 64-66; Case C-87/12, Kreshnik Ymeraga and Others v Ministre du Travail, de 
l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, EU:C:2013:291, para. 42; Case C-304/14, Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v CS, EU:C:2016:674, paras. 29-32; Case C-165/14, 
Alfredo Rendón Marín v Administración del Estado, EU:C:2016:675, paras. 71-78; Case 
C-115/15, Secretary of State for the Home Department v NA, EU:C:2016:487, para. 72.
9 See, for example, case C-237/94, John O’Flynn v Adjudication Officer, EU:C:1996:206, 
Judgement of the Court of 23 May 1996 and case law cited therein. 
10 See to that effect, Craig, P.; de Búrca, G., EU Law ..., op. cit. (fn. 7), pp. 828 – 829. 
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The CJEU is a catalyst for these developments. In Shaw’s words, the CJEU 
has enthusiastically led the way and often used the concept of EU citizen-
ship to push forward its free movement and non-discrimination case law in 
sometimes unforeseeable directions.11 The combination of citizenship and free 
movement is especially evident in the case law on the right to use minority 
languages in court proceedings.
3. EU CITIZENSHIP AND MINORITY LANGUAGES: CASE LAW 
ANALYSIS
The two seminal judgements in this area seemingly slipped under the radar 
of most theoretical analyses and unwittingly became ‘good law’ and a solid 
reference. More recent is the case Rüffer concerning language rules applicable 
to civil proceedings. The other judgement was rendered in the case Bickel and 
Franz12 concerning language rules applicable to criminal proceedings.
The Court’s judgement in Rüffer was rendered on 27 March 2014, and it 
is relatively short and simple.13 The case originated from a preliminary refer-
ence14 made by the Landesgericht Bozen (County court of Bolzano, Italy) under 
Article 267 TFEU, in proceedings between Ms Grauel Rüffer and Ms Pokorná 
concerning an action for damages following a skiing accident. Ms Grauel Rüffer 
was a German national domiciled in Germany, who was injured in a skiing ac-
cident in the Province of Bolzano. Claiming that the fall was caused by Ms 
Pokorná, a Czech national resident in the Czech Republic, Ms Grauel Rüffer 
sought compensation from her for the damage sustained before the competent 
court in Bolzano. The notice of proceedings, drafted in German language, was 
translated into Czech language. Having received the Czech translation, Ms 
Pokorná submitted her defence in German language as well, raising no objec-
tion as to the choice of German as the language of the case.
11 See Shaw, J., op. cit. (fn. 7), pp. 587 – 588.
12 Case C-274/96, Criminal proceedings against Horst Otto Bickel and Ulrich Franz, 
EU:C:1998:563. 
13 In accordance with Article 20(5) of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union, the case was decided without the submission of Advocate-General’s 
opinion, since it was determined that it raises no new point of law.
14 In most simple terms, preliminary reference is a procedure involving co-operation 
between the Court of Justice and national courts, whereby the Court of Justice is 
competent to give preliminary rulings concerning interpretation of the Treaties and 
the validity and interpretation of acts of institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of 
the Union, upon request of national courts. See Article 267 TFEU. 
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It is important to note that under the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, 
the Italian language is to be used in all proceedings. Documents that do not 
comply with the rules as to the form may be declared invalid, but not if they 
achieve the object for which they were intended. Under the Decree of the 
President of the Republic No 670/1972, the German language may be used 
in court in the Province of Bolzano in criminal, civil and administrative law 
proceedings. Further provisions of this Decree stipulate that German-speaking 
citizens of the Province of Bolzano may use their own language in relations 
with the courts and with the organs and offices of public administration situ-
ated in the Province or which have regional responsibilities, as well as with 
public service contractors who provide public services in the Province. Decree 
of the President of the Republic No. 574/1988 prescribes that in civil proceed-
ings each party shall have the right to choose the language in which he drafts 
his documents. The proceedings shall be monolingual if the document institut-
ing the proceedings and the defence or equivalent documents are drafted in 
the same language. However, in a judgment delivered on 22 November 2012 
(Judgement No. 20715) the Corte suprema di cassazione held that the provi-
sions of the Presidential Decree No. 574/1988 applied only to Italian citizens 
residing in the Province of Bolzano. In other words, if the referring court (i.e. 
court requesting a preliminary reference ruling) was to interpret the relevant 
provisions in accordance with the judgement of the Corte suprema di cassazione, 
it would have had to declare both the application and defence invalid, since 
neither was submitted by an Italian citizen residing in the Province of Bolza-
no. The referring court was therefore in doubt whether EU law, specifically 
provisions of Articles 18 and 21 TFEU preclude the application of national 
rules granting the right to use German language in civil proceedings before 
the courts in the Province of Bolzano only to Italian citizens domiciled in that 
Province. 
In its answer, the Court (unsurprisingly) invoked its prior decision in case 
Bickel and Franz. In the latter judgement15 the Court interpreted the same 
TFEU provisions, holding that the right conferred by national rules to have 
criminal proceedings conducted in a language other than the principal lan-
guage of the state concerned falls within the scope of EU law. Thus, if lan-
guage rules allow nationals of that State who reside in a particular geographic 
entity to choose a certain language in criminal proceedings, the same right 
should be conferred on nationals of other Member States travelling or stay-
15 Case C-274/96, op. cit. (fn. 12), Judgement of the Court of 24 November 1998.
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ing in that area, whose language is the same.16 The considerations from Bickel 
and Franz were extended in Rüffer to apply to all judicial proceedings brought 
within that territorial entity, including civil proceedings. The main argument 
basically boiled down to stating the obvious that if it were otherwise, Union 
citizens would be treated less favourably, depending on their domicile, which 
is contrary to the principle of non-discrimination. 
In other words, this is a pure and simple case of discrimination. By limiting 
the choice of language of the proceedings only to Italian citizens residing in the 
province in question, other EU citizens, irrespective of their place of residence, 
hence even Italian citizens residing in other territories of that same State, or in 
other Member States, would be placed in a less favourable position. Although 
the Court based its decision primarily on the principle of non-discrimination, 
there is another angle to be read into the Court’s interpretation. This rule di-
rectly obstructs one of the defining features of EU citizenship: free movement. 
Mobile EU citizens are bound to seize any opportunity there is in order to 
simplify the realisation of their rights. It is interesting to note that the factual 
background in both Bickel and Franz and Rüffer cases involved EU citizens who 
were exercising fundamental economic freedoms in the internal market (i.e. 
from what can be inferred, free movement of persons and services)17, but the 
Court nevertheless based its reasoning on a more wider freedom of movement 
for all EU citizens, which applies regardless of any economic activity.18 
This case law development is a clear evidence of mutual influence of cit-
izenship and internal market freedom of movement case law. Namely, the 
judgement (and especially the opinion of Advocate General) in case Bickel and 
Franz contains several references to the case Mutsch19, a pre-citizenship case in-
16 Note that in case of criminal proceedings all suspected and accused persons within 
the EU have a right to interpretation and translation free of charge by virtue of 
Directive 2010/64/EU, as shall be discussed in more detail later on. 
17 Mr Franz and Ms Rüffer were tourists; Mr Bickel a lorry driver.
18 Freedom of movement and residence of Union citizens is subject to the limitations 
and conditions laid down in the Treaty and in secondary legislation, the most im-
portant being the Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family mem-
bers to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 
72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC (OJ L 158/77 of 30 April 2004), which applies both to economically 
active and economically inactive EU citizens and their family members.
19 Case 137/84, Criminal proceedings against Robert Heinrich Maria Mutsch, 
EU:C:1985:335.
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volving the right of a migrant worker, a Luxembourg national, to use German 
as the language of criminal proceedings conducted against him in a German-
speaking municipality in Belgium. The Belgian authorities tried to deny him 
that right, claiming that it was reserved only for Belgian nationals residing in 
that municipality. Since the case precedes the introduction of EU citizenship, 
the legal basis for the Court’s decision establishing discrimination was found 
in the Treaty provisions and secondary legislation on the free movement of 
workers.20 Case Rüffer, on the other hand, relies exclusively on Article 18 and 
21 TFEU (prohibition of discrimination based on nationality and free move-
ment of EU citizens), even though, strictly speaking, Ms Rüffer was also ex-
ercising one of the fundamental economic freedoms at the time she suffered 
an accident resulting in the instigation of proceedings (she visited the area as 
a tourist).
However, national policies and rules regarding the right to use minority 
languages are drafted and implemented without the slightest consideration 
of EU citizenship. This was the main argument that the Italian Government 
brought forward in defence of the limited application of the language rules. 
Both in Bickel and Franz and in Rüffer, the Italian Government argued that the 
right to use the ethnic and cultural minority language is specifically designed 
to meet the needs of the ethnic and cultural minorities living in a certain area, 
and that there is no need to extend this right to persons who are present in 
that area on an infrequent and temporary basis21, such as mobile EU citizens 
exercising their right to free movement. There are other available measures 
which guarantee that such persons will be able to exercise their procedural 
rights, even when they are not familiar with the official language of the host 
state. The Court was quick to dismiss this argument as contrary to the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination, because the rule unduly favours nationals of the 
host Member State by comparison with nationals of other Member States 
exercising their right to free movement. Since both cases involved indirect 
discrimination based on residence requirement, the Court went on to examine 
20 The right to use German language in proceedings before the courts of the Member 
State in which the migrant worker resides, under the same conditions as national 
workers, was found to fall within the meaning of the term ‘social advantage’ as 
used in Article 7(2) of Regulation No. 1612/68, according to which a worker who 
is national of another Member State is entitled, in the host Member State, to the 
same social and tax advantages as national workers. See Judgement of the Court of 
11 July 1985 in case Mutsch, para. 17.
21 Case Rüffer, op. cit. (fn. 2), para. 22; case Bickel and Franz, op. cit. (fn. 12), para. 21.
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whether there are possible justifications for the difference in treatment. Only 
objective considerations unrelated to the nationality of the persons concerned, 
which are proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions could 
serve as justification. The Italian Government in Rüffer brought forward two 
arguments against the application of the language rule to all EU citizens: the 
first concerned organisational issues in connection with the conduct of the 
proceedings, and the second the financial aspects of such practice.22 The Court 
rejected both, without even proceeding to assess the proportionality of the 
measure. As regards the first argument, there was no evidence that the courts 
in the Province of Bolzano would be faced with cumbersome consequences in 
terms of organisation and time limits. Quite the contrary, the referring court 
undeniably confirmed that the judges are perfectly able to conduct judicial 
proceedings in either Italian or in German, or in both languages.23 Regarding 
the extra costs which would be incurred by the Member State concerned if 
language rules were to be applied to all EU citizens, the Court noted that the 
aims of a purely economic nature cannot constitute pressing reasons of public 
interest justifying the restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty.
4. DIVISION OF COMPETENCES: A MINOR(ITY) ISSUE? 
In our opinion, the implications of the discussed reasoning and case law 
in Member States which recognize equal right to use minority and official 
language in court proceedings are far reaching, at least in theory. According to 
this case law, official minority language may be used by all EU citizens, even 
though they are not considered as members of a minority. Quite the opposite: 
where they come from, they are probably members of a ‘majority’ population. 
Since the EU policy fosters ‘zero tolerance’ towards any form of discrimination 
of EU citizens24, they will be able to benefit from the official status and use of 
a minority language before competent authorities in a particular territory of 
that Member State.
22 Case Rüffer, op. cit. (fn. 2), para. 24 – 25.
23 Ibid., para. 24.
24 That said, this statement does not apply to the situations of the so-called ‘reverse’ 
discrimination, nor to the exclusion of some categories of EU citizens (primarily 
economically inactive) from social entitlements in the Member State of residence.
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The status of minority languages is a matter of internal competences of 
the EU Member States. This means that the Member States and not the EU 
have the competence to regulate this issue. Albeit the respect for the rights 
of persons belonging to national minorities is one of the fundamental values 
on which the European Union is founded25, and the Union respects its “rich 
linguistic and cultural diversity”26, nothing beyond the mere proclamation of 
these values falls within the sphere of the EU competences. It is important 
to emphasize that the Court clearly did not extend the right to use minority 
language to another Member State or its territorial entity, where it does not 
enjoy the status of a minority language in official use. There is no explicit right 
to use minority language enshrined in the Treaties.27 Whether an EU citizen 
will have access to courts in another Member State, or access to other official 
bodies using a language of a certain minority in that State (which is actually 
his/her native language; and presumably, majority language in his/her state 
of origin) depends on the regulation of protection of minorities and minority 
languages in a particular Member State. Nevertheless, Member States must 
take efforts not to violate the principle of non-discrimination in the applica-
tion of their respective legislations in this regard. In a similar vein, Member 
States should avoid discriminating between their nationals and non-nationals 
who are EU citizens.
4.1. International instruments for the protection of minorities in the 
EU Member States
The majority of Member States adhere to international conventions and 
other instruments guaranteeing the protection of minorities, meaning that this 
issue is regulated by national legislation, which applies and implements inter-
25 Article 2 Treaty on European Union (hereinafter: TEU) (Consolidated version 
2016), Official Journal of the European Union, C 202 of 7 June 2016.
26 Article 3(3)(4) TEU.
27 The term ‘minority’ itself has been introduced into EU primary law with the Treaty 
of Lisbon in 2009 (Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 
2007, Official Journal of the European Union, C 306 of 17 December 2007). Arti-
cle 24 TFEU provides that every citizen of the Union may write to any EU institu-
tion or body in one of the languages of the Treaties, i.e. any of 24 official languages 
of the EU, regional or minority languages excluded. See more on this issue in Du-
bos, O.; Guset, V., European Law and Regional or Minority Languages, in: Ippolito, F.; 
Iglesias Sánchez, S. (eds.), Protecting Vulnerable Groups. The European Human Rights 
Framework, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2015, pp. 115 – 140.
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national commitments and standards of protection. Among the most impor-
tant international instruments which guarantee the protection of minorities 
are the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter: 
ICCPR)28, UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities29, Council of Europe Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities30, Council of Europe 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages31, etc.32 None of these 
instruments define the term ‘national minority’ or ‘linguistic minority’.33 The 
28 Article 27 ICCPR: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in commu-
nity with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”
29 Article 5(1) of the Declaration: “National policies and programmes shall be planned 
and implemented with due regard for the legitimate interests of persons belonging 
to minorities.”
30 Article 5(1) of the Framework Convention: “The Parties undertake to promote the 
conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain 
and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, 
namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage.” Article 10(1) of 
the Framework Convention: “The Parties undertake to recognise that every person 
belonging to a national minority has the right to use freely and without interfer-
ence his or her minority language, in private and in public, orally and in writing.” 
According to Gorter and Cenoz, the Framework Convention is not completely satis-
factory because it was drafted with a lot of compromises between different views of 
the Member States, while its provisions add little to the existing international law. 
See Gorter, D.; Cenoz, J., Legal Rights of Linguistic Minorities in the European Union, 
in: Tiersma, P. M.; Solan, L. M. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Language and the Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 261 – 272, p. 267. See also Gorter, D., 
Minorities and Language, in: Brown, K., Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd ed., 
(ELL2), Elsevier, London, 2006, pp. 156 – 159.
31 Out of 28 EU Member States, 17 have ratified the Charter and 3 have signed, but 
not yet ratified it. In Croatia, the Charter has been in force since 1 March 1998 
(Narodne novine, Međunarodni ugovori, No. 18/97). The work of the Council of 
Europe is probably most important for the protection of linguistic rights in Europe. 
The Charter has been drafted over a long period of time with recommendations 
from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Par-
liament (see Gorter and Cenoz, op. cit. (fn. 28), p. 265). 
32 For an overview of international and domestic instruments protecting the equal 
right to use minority languages in Croatia, see Petričušić, A., Ravnopravna službena 
uporaba jezika i pisma nacionalnih manjina: Izvori domaćeg i međunarodnog prava, 
Zagrebačka pravna revija, vol. II, no. 1, 2013, pp. 11 – 39.
33 For a detailed elaboration on this issue, see Petričušić, A., The Rights of Minorities in 
International Law: Tracing Developments in Normative Arrangements of International Or-
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latter task is left to the individual states, which are responsible for the protec-
tion of national minorities.34 Note that being recognised as a national minority 
does not automatically entail recognition of the right to official use of a mi-
nority language. For example, the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages obliges its parties to recognise the right of every person belonging 
to a national minority to use freely and without interference his or her mi-
nority language, in public and private, orally and in writing.35 Only in areas 
inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in sub-
stantial numbers, where such persons so request and the request corresponds 
to a real need, the states “shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, the 
conditions which would make it possible to use the minority language in rela-
tions between those persons and the administrative authorities”.36 In criminal 
proceedings, the obligation of the state is to ensure that a person belonging 
to a national minority is informed of the reasons for accusation or arrest in 
a language he or she understands, has a right to defence in this language and 
a free assistance of the interpreter.37 There is no corresponding guarantee in 
civil proceedings, however. As defined by the Charter, “regional or minority 
languages” are languages traditionally used within a given territory of a state 
by nationals of that state who form a group numerically smaller than the rest 
of the state’s population; they are different from the official language(s) of that 
state, and they include neither dialects of the official language(s) of the state 
nor the languages of migrants.38 
ganizations, Croatian International Relations Review, vol. XI, no. 38/39, 2005, pp. 
47 – 58. 
34 The Preamble to the Croatian Constitution, for example, enumerates national mi-
norities in Croatia, establishing that Republic of Croatia is “the nation state of the 
Croatian nation and the state of the members of its national minorities: Serbs, 
Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians, 
Rusyns, Bosniaks, Slovenians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Russians, Bulgarians, 
Poles, Roma, Romanians, Turks, Vlachs, Albanians and others who are its citi-
zens…”
35 Article 10(1) European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
36 Article 10(2) European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
37 Article 10(3) European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
38 Article 1(a)(i) European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Some schol-
ars draw a distinction between the term language minority and minority languages. 
While the former refers to the social group or community, the latter refers to a 
specific category of languages, also called lesser-used languages (see Gorter, D., op. 
cit. (fn. 28)). 
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4.2.  Use of language and the right of defence: A (limited) EU legal 
framework 
Given the above considerations, let us imagine a situation in which an EU 
citizen of German nationality, for example, is a party in court proceedings in 
another Member State, for example, Croatia. Germans are one of the 22 na-
tional minorities in Croatia. Alas, German is not a minority language in official 
use in Croatia (i.e. any of its territorial entities). If he were involved in a civil 
proceeding, whether as a claimant or respondent, his only option would be to 
use a court interpreter.
However, the status of our German friend would be better (at least lan-
guage-wise), if he were accused with a criminal offence in Croatia. In that case, 
he would have had a right to free assistance of a court interpreter. Adhering 
to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights39, each Member 
State guarantees a right to a fair trial, including both civil and criminal mat-
ters.40 As a specific guarantee under the right of defence, anyone charged with 
a criminal offence shall have a right to a free assistance of an interpreter, if he 
cannot understand or speak the language used in the court.41 However, there is 
another instrument at EU level facilitating the application of the right to a fair 
trial enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the respect of 
the right of defence from Article 48(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU. 
This instrument is the Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation 
and translation in criminal proceedings.42 
In particular, it is interesting to explore whether the latter Directive could 
serve as an alternative to the approach adopted in the discussed judgments 
in Rüffer and Bickel and Franz cases. At first glimpse, it is evident that the 
Directive does not aim at improving the status of linguistic minorities. As a 
39 Zakon o potvrđivanju Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda i 
Protokola br. 1., 4., 6., 7. i 11. uz Konvenciju za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih 
sloboda, Narodne novine, Međunarodni ugovori, No. 18/97.
40 European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. Right to a fair trial (civil limb). Available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf. (Accessed: 1 September 2016). 
41 Article 6(3)(e) European Convention on Human Rights. 
42 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Right 
to Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings of 20 October 2010, Of-
ficial Journal of the European Union, L 280/1 of 26 October 2010.
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background note, Directive 2010/64/EU, also known as the roadmap directive, 
was adopted in light of the growing mobility of EU citizens and the enlargement 
of the EU which increased the number of criminal proceedings involving EU 
citizens, that is, nationals of one Member State who are suspected or accused 
of committing a crime in another State. In response to an increased need for 
court interpreting, the Commission proposed the first legislative instrument 
in the field of criminal law, namely Directive 2010/64/EU which was adopted 
by the European Parliament and the Council on 20 October 2010. The legal 
base for the Directive 2010/64/EU is found in Article 82(2) TFEU, i.e. in the 
area of freedom, security and justice. Its primary aim is to increase confidence 
in criminal justice systems of all Member States, which leads to more efficient 
judicial cooperation and mutual recognition of judgements in criminal matters 
having a cross-border dimension.43
The deadline for its transposition by the Member States was 27 October 
2013. As an instrument of secondary law, directives must be transposed into 
national legislation, whereas the Member States have the choice of the form 
and method by means of which the result of a directive is to be achieved. This 
is important to emphasize since the Directive has been transposed into Mem-
ber States to a varying degree. While some states took great effort to raise the 
standards of protection provided for by the Directive such as Germany, others 
are still struggling to meet the minimum standards imposed by the Directive.44 
In a similar vein, recent case law of the CJEU has made the point that Direc-
tive 2010/64 laid down only minimum rules, while the Member States are 
entitled to provide a higher level of protection, “also in situations not explicitly 
dealt with in that directive”.45 
43 Recitals 3 and 4 of the Preamble of the Directive 2010/64/EU.
44 As stated in our earlier research, the wording of the Directive is sometimes vague or 
unclear, thus calling for caution by the Member States when implementing the Di-
rective. Furthermore, even basic concepts such as criminal proceedings are not defined 
in the Directive, but is, instead, to be interpreted in the light of the European Court 
of Human Rights case law. On the other hand, the meaning of essential documents 
which played an important role in the Covaci case, is circumscribed as follows: ‘any 
decision depriving a person of his liberty, any charge or indictment and any judg-
ment’ (Art. 3 (2)), albeit paragraph 3 of the same Article authorizes the competent 
authority to decide whether any other document is to be deemed essential in a given 
case. This view has been upheld in the Covaci case. See Bajčić, M., The Way Forward 
for Court Interpreting in Europe, in: Šarčević, S. (ed.), Language and Culture in EU Law. 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Ashgate, Surrey, 2015, pp. 219 – 239, 220 – 221.
45 Case C-216/14, Criminal proceedings against Gavril Covaci, EU:C:2015:686.
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The Covaci case is so far the first case referred to the CJEU in regard to the 
Directive 2010/64/EU, although it concerned another roadmap directive too, 
namely Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceed-
ings46, whose aim is enabling preparation of defence and safeguarding fairness 
of the proceedings. 
The facts of the case are as follows. A Romanian national was charged in 
Germany with driving without mandatory motor insurance. In view of the fact 
that he was charged with a minor offence, the public prosecutor asked the local 
court (Amtsgericht Laufen) to issue a Strafbefehl (penalty order) without hold-
ing a hearing or trial and to impose a fine on Mr Covaci. German law did not 
provide for a free translation of a written appeal against the penalty order. In 
this context it should be mentioned that the Directive 2010/64/EU does apply 
to appeals before courts following the imposition of sanctions for minor of-
fences (Art. 2(2): during appeal or any other procedural application), although 
interpreters are not required to be present in cases of minor offences such as 
traffic offences. As foreseen by German national legislation, once the penal 
order has been served, an objection can be filed within a two-week period. In 
case a person does not have a fixed German address, he or she must appoint 
someone with residence in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Before issuing the penal order, Amtsgericht Laufen referred two questions to 
the CJEU. Firstly, Amtsgericht Laufen was uncertain about the conformity 
of the German law with Directive 2010/64/EU (in regard to the fact that an 
objection must be made in German): “Are Articles 1(2) and 2(1) and (8) of 
Directive 2010/64 to be interpreted as precluding a court order that requires, 
under Paragraph 184 of the Law on the judicial system, accused persons to 
bring an appeal only in the language of the court, here in German, in order for 
it to be effective?” Secondly: “Are Articles 2, 3(1)(c) and 6(1) and (3) of Direc-
tive 2012/13 to be interpreted as precluding the accused from being required 
to appoint a person authorised to accept service, where the period for bringing 
an appeal begins to run upon service on the person authorised and ultimately 
is it irrelevant whether the accused is at all aware of the offence of which he is 
accused?” In other words, Amtsgericht Laufen had doubts as to the compat-
ibility of the obligations imposed on individuals, non-residents of Germany, to 
appoint a person with a fixed German address to receive the documents to be 
46 Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and the Council on the right to 
information in criminal proceedings of 22 May 2012, Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Union, L 142/1 of 1 June 2012.
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served with Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information. As a result of 
this requirement, the documents could reach the suspect after two weeks, thus 
robbing the suspect of the possibility to file a timely objection.
As regards the first question, it must be borne in mind that Directive 
2010/64/EU is vague in its provisions about the necessity to translate essential 
documents. Basically, whether a certain document is to be considered essential 
and thus warrants written or oral translation, is left to the Member States to 
decide. CJEU said that Articles 1 to 3 of Directive 2010/64 must be interpret-
ed as not precluding national legislation.47 With respect to the second ques-
tion, CJEU held that the Directive 2012/13/EU does not preclude legislation 
that obliges someone not residing in its territory to appoint someone on whom 
the documents may be served, as long as the accused person actually has the 
full period prescribed for filing an objection.48 In any event, the CJEU makes it 
clear that Member States should avoid discriminating between persons having 
a fixed address on their territory and those who don’t, and to whom the detri-
mental method of calculating the two-week period would be applied. 
Since both mentioned Directives concern criminal proceedings, Rüffer-type 
of cases could never fall under this category. As far as the Bickel and Franz case 
is concerned, given that it involves criminal offences, it is evident that the 
accused would be in a much better position invoking the right to use official 
minority language, if the circumstances so allow. In that case, the proceed-
ings would be conducted in that language, thus avoiding any potential un-
47 The CJEU said that “Articles 1 to 3 of Directive 2010/64 must be interpreted as not 
precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, 
in criminal proceedings, does not permit the individual against whom a penalty or-
der has been made to lodge an objection in writing against that order in a language 
other than that of the proceedings, even though that individual does not have a 
command of the language of the proceedings, provided that the competent authori-
ties do not consider, in accordance with Article 3(3) of that directive, that, in the 
light of the proceedings concerned and the circumstances of the case, such an objec-
tion constitutes an essential document.” Case Covaci, op. cit. (fn. 43), Judgement of 
the Court of 15 October 2015, para. 51.
48 “...Articles 2, 3(1)(c) and 6(1) and (3) of Directive 2012/13 must be interpreted as 
not precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, which, in criminal proceedings, makes it mandatory for an accused 
person not residing in that Member State to appoint a person authorised to accept 
service of a penalty order concerning him, provided that that accused person does 
in fact have the benefit of the whole of the prescribed period for lodging an objec-
tion against that order.” Case Covaci, op. cit. (fn. 43), Judgement of the Court of 15 
October 2015, para. 68. 
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certainties regarding the implementation and interpretation of the Directive 
2010/64/EU.
It is possible, however, that national courts in criminal proceedings involv-
ing a cross-border element would be more inclined towards adhering to na-
tional laws implementing Directive 2010/64/EU, disregarding that there may 
be a minority language in official use before that particular court. As a result, 
all minimum guarantees forming part of a right of defence would be satisfied. 
Nevertheless, the right to use minority language as a right derived from EU 
citizenship is broader and possibly more straightforward, since it alters the 
language of the proceedings itself, and does not just facilitate the method of 
communication with the court (i.e. with the aid of court interpreter). Also, let 
us not forget that the CJEU case law interpreting the Directive 2010/64/EU is 
still very limited, whereas further clarifications are to be expected. 
5. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RÜFFER JUDGEMENT: THE 
CROATIAN EXAMPLE
In order to avoid similar cases of the above discussed clashes between na-
tional and EU law, it is of paramount importance that national legislators start 
to take into account the implications of EU citizenship and in particular the 
principle of free movement with all its ramifications in their regulation of the 
right to use minority languages. The challenges faced by the Member States in 
this pursuit are clarified on the example of Croatia. 
5.1. De lege lata
Croatian legislation and practice may serve as a textbook example to explain 
the potential consequences of the Rüffer judgement in practice. The Croatian 
Constitution guarantees that in individual local units, another language and 
Cyrillic or some other script may be introduced in official use together with 
the Croatian language and Latin script under conditions specified by law.49 
Croatia has ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities50 and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.51 
49 Article 12(2) Constitution (Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Narodne novine, Nos. 
56/90, 135/97, 113/00, 28/01, 76/10 and 5/14).
50 Zakon o potvrđivanju Okvirne konvencije za zaštitu nacionalnih manjina, Narodne 
novine, Međunarodni ugovori, No. 14/97. 
51 In Croatia, the Charter has been in force since 1 March 1998, Narodne novine, 
Međunarodni ugovori, No. 18/97.
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Under Article 12 of the Constitutional National Minority Rights Act52, equal-
ity in the official use of a minority language and script shall be exercised in the 
territory of a local self-government unit in which the members of a national 
minority compose a minimum of one third of the population; or when so en-
visaged in international treaties to which the Republic of Croatia is a party or 
stipulated in the statutes of a local or regional self-government unit, pursuant 
to the provisions of special legislation on the use of minority languages and 
scripts in the Republic of Croatia. Under the Act on the Use of Language and 
Script of the National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia53, equal official 
use of language and script of national minority on the territory of a munici-
pality, city or county shall be implemented in the work of representative and 
executive bodies of a given territorial unit, procedure before administrative 
authorities of that territorial unit, procedure before state administrative bodies 
of first instance, judicial authorities of first instance, public prosecution offices 
of first instance, public notaries and legal persons with public authorities in 
that territorial unit. According to the data of June 2013, minority language is 
in official use in 55 local units, out of which members of a particular minority 
comprise more than 1/3 of population in 27 local units, and in 28 local units 
official equal use of minority language is guaranteed in the statute of the local 
unit.54 
Our focus here is put on the right to use minority language in national 
court proceedings of first instance. All judicial authorities of first instance are 
required to inform the party from the territory of city or municipality which has 
introduced official use of a minority language that he/she has a right to use 
52 Ustavni zakon o pravima nacionalnih manjina, Narodne novine, Nos. 155/02 
47/10, 80/10, 93/11 and 93/11.
53 Zakon o uporabi jezika i pisma nacionalnih manjina u Republici Hrvatskoj, Na-
rodne novine, Nos. 51/00, 56/00 and 155/02.
54 Fourth report submitted by Croatia pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 2 of the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ACFC/SR/
IV(2014)012, Strasbourg, 11 September 2014. Available at:
 https://pravamanjina.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/dokumenti/%c4%8cetvrto%20
izvje%c5%a1%c4%87e%20o%20provedbi%20Okvirne%20konvencije%20%20
za%20za%c5%a1titu%20nacionalnih%20manjina.pdf (Accessed: 20 June 2016). 
This is especially true of Italian language in some municipalities in the Istria Coun-
ty, where the population of Italian minority amounts to even less than 5 %. This is 
also one of the most prosperous tourist regions, in close vicinity to Italy and with 
many visiting Italian tourists, which allows parallels to be drawn with the case 
Rüffer.
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that language, while the option chosen by the party will be officially record-
ed.55 From the exact wording of this provision, it is clear that only parties 
domiciled in the territory of a local unit which grants the right of official use of 
a minority language are entitled to use that language. This provision directly 
contravenes the interpretation provided by the CJEU in Rüffer and Bickel and 
Franz. As a matter of fact, the wording of the Croatian provision echoes the 
gist of the provision of the Italian Presidential Decree from the Rüffer case.56 
However, unlike the situation in the Rüffer case, where a provision of the Presi-
dential Decree was also interpreted to this effect by the Italian Corte suprema 
di cassazione57, in Croatia there is no specific case law either applying or inter-
preting this provision. The Croatian judiciary is traditionally inclined towards 
formalistic and grammatical interpretation of legal norms, that is, to strict 
adherence to the letter of the law.58 The courts may find that the only way for 
this provision to be applied in conformity with the CJEU case law is to read 
it contra legem, which is not permissible. Even if, when faced with a dilemma, 
a Croatian court were to refer a preliminary reference to the CJEU, thus ques-
tioning the compatibility of the Croatian provision with the EU law, the CJEU 
would likely rule by issuing a reasoned order59, referring to its earlier case law 
in view of the fact that an identical question had already been answered in the 
Rüffer judgement. 
55 Article 12(1) Act on the Use of Language and Script of National Minorities in the 
Republic of Croatia.
56 Art. 100 of the Presidential Decree No 670/1972 reads as follows: “I cittadini di 
lingua tedesca della provincia di Bolzano hanno facoltà di usare la loro lingua nei rap-
porti cogli uffici giudiziari e con gli organi e uffici della pubblica amministrazione 
situati nella provincia…” 
57 For a critical overview of this decision, see Hofmeister, H., La giurisprudenza della 
Corte di giustizia dell’ue sulla lingua processuale dinanzi ai tribunali altoatesini. Un’analisi 
del caso Grauel Rüffer, Osservatorio sulle fonti, fasc. 1/2016. Available at: http://
www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/archivi/archivio-saggi/speciali/speciale-convegno-prin-
2010-11-bolzano/986-osf-1-2016-hofmeister/file (Accessed: 19 June 2016).
58 See for example, the analysis of the capacity of the Croatian judiciary to apply EU 
equality law in Bodiroga-Vukobrat, N.; Martinović, A., Croatia’s Accession in the Light 
of Gender Equality, European Gender Equality Law Review, vol. I, no. 1, 2013, pp. 
5 – 16.
59 Article 99, Consolidated version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 
25 September 2012. Available at: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/applica-
tion/pdf/2012-10/rp_en.pdf (Accessed: 29 November 2016).
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5.2.  De lege ferenda: Counterbalancing Free Movement and the Protecti-
on of Linguistic Minorities
Therefore, the best way to effectively remedy this situation is to amend 
the law accordingly. This can be achieved by simply deleting the part of the 
sentence “from the territory of city or municipality that has introduced of-
ficial use of a minority language and script”. The real question is, whether it 
is realistic to expect any amendments of this kind in the near future. There 
are multifold reasons for this scepticism. First, national policies for the protec-
tion of minorities and the use of minority languages in general are not easily 
conceived in the context of the free movement of EU citizens. Rather, they are 
mostly framed in line with the international commitments and instruments 
ratified by a certain state. The overriding purpose of those instruments is first 
and foremost to protect cultural heritage and diversity.60 It is difficult to recon-
cile the idea of protection of a national, ethnic, cultural or linguistic minority 
on the one hand, with a pure and simple notion of free movement of EU citi-
zens, on the other. The essence and the purpose of the provisions regulating 
these two fields are entirely different. It may seem as though the legislation 
for the protection of national minorities becomes a tool to enhance mobility 
for the sake of mobility per se, without any link with the real purpose of that 
legislation. Thus, ‘majority’ language of one Member State could become the 
official language of the proceedings in another Member State (in which it is a 
minority language). Any other measure61, which might be in place to ensure 
that a person who is not familiar with the language of the proceedings will be 
able to exercise his or her procedural rights, becomes redundant. However, one 
may argue that the freedom of movement and non-discrimination is guaran-
teed to all EU citizens, whether they are members of a minority community or 
not. Therefore, the principle of non-discrimination could be viewed as a bridge 
binding these provisions.  
60 For example, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is a convention 
designed on the one hand to protect and promote historical regional and minority 
languages as a threatened aspect of Europe’s cultural wealth and traditions; and 
on the other hand to promote the right to use a regional or minority language in 
private and public life as an inalienable right conforming to the principles embodied 
in the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
according to the spirit of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Preamble).
61 Primarily, the help of court interpreters. However, the party has to bear the cost of 
such interpretation in advance and ensure translation of all documents, petitions 
and motions.
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Secondly, in the Croatian context, the actual usage of this right is only 
marginal. According to the available data, in 2012, there were 487 proceed-
ings conducted before municipal courts and courts of minor offences in which 
the parties were informed of their right to use minority language. In only two 
instances the parties opted for a minority language as the language of proceed-
ings (in both cases the Italian language).62 Out of 338 cases in 2011, three 
were conducted in a minority language (again, Italian language).63 It would 
seem that the trend is improving, since in 2013, there were 10 cases in which 
the parties opted for a minority language before one municipal court.64 Given 
the low count of cases in which this right was actually used, any amendment of 
this provision would probably not be among the highest legislative priorities. 
Nevertheless, these statistics are important. They show that all cases where 
the use of minority language in court proceedings was invoked are concen-
trated in Istria, Croatian peninsula situated in the Northern Adriatic, border-
ing Italy and Slovenia. Istria is a very important tourist region, with many 
tourists from Italy visiting year-round. One can only imagine the potential 
impact of the Rüffer judgement to this region. Is an eruption of cases involv-
ing Italian citizens domiciled in Italy or another Member State and claiming 
the right to use Italian as the official language of minority (on equal footing 
with the Italian minority in the region) before courts in specific parts of Istria 
likely? A variety of potential disputes is always possible, most common would 
probably involve claims for damages in tort or contractual liability, or minor 
offences. To reiterate, should standard rules be applied, Croatian would be the 
language of the proceedings. That means that parties who do not understand 
the language of the proceedings would have to have a court interpreter, and 
would also have to communicate with the court in the official language of the 
proceedings, which is Croatian. Pursuant to Article 102(4) of the Croatian 
Civil Procedure Act65, the cost of interpretation is born by the party or another 
participant in the proceedings who requires interpretation. On the other hand, 
the cost of interpretation and translation to and from the languages of national 
minorities is covered from the court’s own resources.66 The same practice ap-
62 Fourth Report, op. cit. (fn. 52), p. 65.
63 Loc. cit. 
64 Municipal court Rovinj-Rovigno (Istria County). There is no available data for oth-
er courts in 2013, or for later period.
65 Zakon o parničnom postupku, Narodne novine, Nos. 53/91, 91/92, 112/99, 129/00, 
88/01, 117/03, 88/05, 2/07, 96/08, 84/08, 123/08, 57/11, 25/13 and 89/14.
66 Article 105(2) Civil Procedure Act.
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plies to criminal law cases in which the costs of interpretation and translation 
are covered by the state. The procedural costs play an important part when 
deciding whether to initiate certain proceedings or not. Needless to say, if one 
cost aspect is eliminated, chances are that more people will be likely to insti-
gate court proceedings.
This leads us to another important remark: it takes only one party to the 
proceedings to trigger the possibility of application of a minority language in 
official use. In accordance with Article 14(1) of the Act on the Use of Language 
and Script of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, when a party in 
the proceedings declares that he/she opts for the use of a minority language, a 
body conducting the proceedings shall take all necessary measures, in accord-
ance with procedural rules, to ensure effective use of that right. Consequently, 
there is no need for a common accord of both parties. All documents and com-
munication will be delivered to that party not only in the minority language, 
but also in Croatian as well.67 
6. CONCLUSION
It is the Member States, not the EU, that determine the level of rights to be 
given to the minorities. Nevertheless, recent developments of the CJEU case 
law have paved the way towards ensuring more protection to all EU citizens, 
in particular due to the possibility to use minority languages in court proceed-
ings. This development is not just unilaterally beneficial. Linguistic minorities 
are today more valued owing largely to the EU’s respect for cultural, religious 
and linguistic diversity enshrined in Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union which became legally binding with the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. In consequence, if properly real-
ised in the context of EU citizenship, linguistic pluralism could prosper and 
become more than just a symbolic European added value. 
It is up to the Member States to take the lead in ensuring that the right to 
use minority languages is duly protected and that the national legislation gov-
erning minorities does not run counter to EU law, in particular to the principle 
of non-discrimination and the right to free movement guaranteed to all EU 
citizens. Otherwise, the Member States risk having infringement proceedings 
for violation of EU law taken up against them by the European Commission.
67 Article 14(2) Act on the Use of Language and Script of National Minorities in the 
Republic of Croatia. 
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GRAÐANSTVO EUROPSKE UNIJE, SLOBODA KRETANJA I 
PRAVO NA UPORABU MANJINSKOG JEZIKA U SUDSKOM 
POSTUPKU
Zabrana diskriminacije temeljem državljanstva temeljno je načelo i ishodište slobode 
kretanja u Europskoj uniji. Primjena tog načela u praksi izaziva ponekad (ne)očekivane 
posljedice. U ovom radu analizira se primjer prava na uporabu manjinskog jezika u 
sudskom postupku. Status i pravo na uporabu manjinskog jezika razlikuje se u državama 
članicama EU-a, ali je najčešće ograničeno na određena područja države u kojima se 
jamči ravnopravna uporaba manjinskog i službenog jezika pred upravnim i/ili sudskim 
tijelima, u radu predstavničkih ili izvršnih tijela lokalne vlasti, obrazovanju itd. Opseg 
ovog jamstva u potpunosti ovisi o nacionalnom zakonodavstvu i međunarodnim obvezama 
države članice. Međutim, gotovo isključivo pridržano je za pripadnike određene nacionalne 
manjine koji su državljani određene države i prebivaju na određenom teritoriju te države. 
Učinak tog pravila u multinacionalnom i višejezičnom okružju Europske unije izaziva 
određene dvojbe, osobito kada se sukobi s načelom zabrane diskriminacije temeljem 
državljanstva. Polazište ovog istraživanja je analiza presude Suda EU-a u predmetu 
Rüffer, C-322/13, u kojoj je Sud smatrao nacionalni propis kojim se pravo na uporabu 
manjinskog jezika u građanskom parničnom postupku ograničava na državljane te 
države s prebivalištem na određenom teritoriju protivnim načelu zabrane diskriminacije 
temeljem državljanstva. U radu se analizira na koji način sudska praksa i pravni okvir 
EU-a mogu utjecati na nacionalnu politiku i pravo zaštite nacionalnih manjina te 
postoji li potreba za de lege ferenda izmjene nacionalnih propisa.   
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